Trump Deals Coincide With Attrition at Some—but Not All—Firms

In late February, the Trump administration began issuing executive orders against large law firms. Four firms fought the orders in court—successfully, so far. Nine firms reached settlements, in which they promised to provide a total of $940 million in pro bono legal services to support causes favored by the administration (among other undertakings).

Roughly six months have passed since the EOs, the filing of lawsuits, and the cutting of deals. How have firms’ divergent responses to the orders affected their headcount? Did lawyers depart from the dealmaking firms and flock to fighting firms, troubled by how the settling firms “caved” or “capitulated” to Trump? Or did partners instead leave the litigating firms for platforms perceived as “safer” for their practices?

A number of lawyers who moved in the wake of the orders made news. Some associates made “noisy withdrawals” from settling firms—like Rachel Cohen, who quit Skadden in April. Some partners lateraled from firms that cut deals to firms that are taking on Trump—like the seven partners who left Willkie for Cooley, which represents Jenner & Block in that firm’s fight against an order. And some partners left settling firms to launch their own boutiques—like the four prominent litigators who left Paul Weiss to start Dunn Isaacson Rhee.

But these reports are anecdotal in nature. I wanted big-picture data—and I received it, courtesy of SurePoint Legal Insights. Formerly Leopard Solutions, SurePoint Legal Insights tracks 6,000 law firms and provides insights on legal industry hiring trends.

I asked SurePoint to track the changes in US headcount, from March 1 through Sept. 8, at 14 firms implicated by the Big Law executive orders: the nine settling firms, the four fighting firms, and Covington & Burling (which was hit with an order but neither sued nor settled). Here’s what SurePoint found:

(Note that the changes to associate and partner headcount include what SurePoint calls “internal” moves—such as an associate’s promotion to partner, or a partner’s move to counsel—and the total headcount change includes changes to the ranks of counsel as well as associates and partners.)

What should we make of this data? Craig Savitzky, manager of research and insights and SurePoint, shared some thoughts with me.

“Headcount trends since March reveal a stark divide in how firms subjected to the Trump EOs have fared,” he wrote by email. “On average, Am Law 100 firms saw modest attrition of just -15 lawyers, or -1.7%. By contrast, several of the firms that chose to settle—such as A&O Shearman (-10%) and Cadwalader (-11%)—experienced some of the steepest declines in the group.”

“Firms actively fighting the EOs, like Jenner & Block (0%) and Perkins Coie (-8%), generally posted mixed results, while Covington, which took no action, effectively broke even,” he continued. “The data suggests that firms’ strategic choices in response to the EOs have coincided with significantly different patterns of retention, with some settlements correlating with sharper-than-average losses.”

The five firms subjected to EOs that didn’t cut deals notched a 2.8% decline in headcount, on average. The nine firms that cut deals with the administration suffered a 4.9% average dip in their ranks, meaning the settling firms’ average attrition rate was 75% larger than that of the fighting firms.

But note Savitzky’s careful wording: Firms’ responses have “coincided” or “correlated” with headcount changes. Correlation doesn’t imply causation, so we can’t definitively declare that a firm’s Trump deal triggered the decline in its ranks.

Take A&O Shearman. Although its 10% headcount dip is striking, we can’t conclude that it resulted from its Trump settlement. While a group of A&O Shearman associates wrote a letter to leadership condemning the firm’s Trump settlement, opining “that agreements of this nature contribute to the degradation of the rule of law in the United States,” we don’t know how much (if any) attorney attrition can be chalked up to deal dissatisfaction.

It’s also important to remember something I learned during my detour into legal recruiting: Individual lawyers make career decisions for multiple reasons. These might include a firm’s culture or values, but they could also encompass client conflicts, financial factors, geographical considerations, and more.

So while some lawyers might have left A&O Shearman because of its Trump settlement, others might have left because of, say, the 2024 merger of Allen & Overy and Shearman & Sterling that created the firm. Partner departures are common both ahead of and after law firm mergers, as noted by Kent Zimmermann of the Zeughauser Group consultancy, as partners pick the best platforms for their practices (or post-merger firms show certain partners the door).

Similarly, some partners who have left Paul Weiss after its controversial settlement might have departed over the deal—possibly former Manhattan US attorney Damian Williams, who left Paul Weiss and joined Jenner & Block, a fighting firm that Williams pointedly praised for “liv[ing] its values.”

But what about the partners who left Paul Weiss for the Dunn Isaacson Rhee boutique? Some of these partners—not just the four founding partners, but other partners who moved later—might have been unhappy with the deal. But some might have moved because of Paul Weiss’s increased emphasis on its transactional practice over litigation or based on the benefits of boutiques over Big Law (such as fewer client conflicts, more autonomy, and a potentially more collegial work environment).

We can, however, make more modest claims based on the data. Firms that cut deals can still grow—such as the only two firms in the cohort of 14 that increased headcount over the relevant period, Milbank and Simpson Thacher, which expanded by 5% and 2%, respectively. And firms that are fighting the EOs can still shrink—like Perkins Coie, whose headcount declined by 8%.

Put another way, the Trump deals might be affecting, but not fundamentally altering, law firms’ overall trajectories. Milbank, for example, grew its profits per equity partner by an astounding 33% in 2024 according to The American Lawyer—landing the firm in the top 10 based on this metric. It invested some of its wealth in expansion, poaching partners from rival firms and hiring out of government.

Last month, Milbank announced midyear bonuses for its associates—the first (and so far only) Big Law firm to do so. Although it’s possible that the firm’s settlement might have hurt it in some respects, Milbank’s future appears bright to me. And notwithstanding its deal, Milbank is still willing to be adverse to the Trump administration—reflected in partners Neal Katyal and Gurbir Grewal taking on the Justice Department in “sanctuary city” litigation, or Katyal litigating against Trump tariffs.

My cautious conclusion is that for Big Law, the Trump deals are a data point—but not destiny.

David Lat, a lawyer turned writer, publishes Original Jurisdiction. He founded Above the Law and Underneath Their Robes, and is author of the novel “Supreme Ambitions.”

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