Supreme Court Limits Factors for Revoking Supervised Release (1)

The US Supreme Court limited what factors judges can consider when deciding whether to revoke a sentence of supervised release.

In a 7-2 decision on Friday, the court’s majority said the statute governing supervised release prevents judges from weighing the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, and provide a just punishment.

Edgardo Esteras, Timothy Jaimez, and Toriano Leaks Jr. argued those factors, which judges must weigh when sentencing someone for a crime under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A), were omitted from the supervised release statute 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e).

Justice Amy Coney Barrett said Congress’ decision to exclude those factors means district courts can’t consider them when deciding whether to revoke supervised release.

“Fines, probation, and imprisonment are a court’s primary tools for ensuring that a criminal defendant receives just deserts for the original offense,” she said.

Supervised release isn’t a punishment in lieu of incarceration, Barrett reasoned, noting it’s instead imposed to help rehabilitate inmates.

“So when a defendant violates the conditions of his supervised release, it makes sense that a court must consider the forward-looking ends of sentencing (deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation), but may not consider the backward-looking purpose of retribution,” she said.

The court’s decision tosses out a decision from the US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and gives the men another chance to appeal rulings that sent them back to prison.

‘Mind-Bending Exercises’

Justice Sonia Sotomayor agreed that district courts may not rely on retributive sentencing factors to revoke supervised release, but in an opinion Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson joined, she said the court framed the question that was before it as one about retribution for the original offense.

“It never decides whether the supervised-release statute precludes courts from exacting retribution for the defendant’s supervised-released violation,” she said.

“Congress studiously omitted all reference to retribution from the supervised-release statute, so retribution should play no role in revocation hearings,” she said, adding that she would have made this point explicit.

Justice Samuel Alito dissented from the court’s decision in an opinion Justice Neil Gorsuch joined. Alito said the court interprets the Sentencing Reform Act to mean a federal district judge “must engage in mind-bending exercises.”

“The judge must take into account ‘the nature and circumstances’ of a defendant’s offense but is forbidden to consider ‘the seriousness of the offense,’” he said. Alito added that the judge must consider what is needed to deter future crime or rehabilitate a defendant, but can’t be influenced by a desire to promote respect for the law.

Sparring with Alito in her majority ruling, Barrett said “not so.”

“We routinely require judges and juries to attend to some considerations while ignoring others,” she said in a footnote.

The case is Esteras v. United States, U.S., No. 23-7483, 6/20/25.