Florida Courts Split on Discrimination Lawsuit Employer ‘Notice’

A rift in Florida law cracked open Wednesday with a state appellate court splitting from pro-business precedent that makes it easier for firms to dismiss poorly-organized discrimination suits, like one filed by a former Steak ‘n Shake cook.

In a loss for industry, workers can’t be blocked from bringing discrimination claims under Florida laws if they don’t explicitly plead a violation of state law in their notice to employers filed when seeking representation from state and federal employment regulators, the Second District Court of Appeal ruled.

The decision directly conflicts with a Fourth District Court of Appeal ruling last month, and tees up the conservative Florida Supreme Court to consider standardizing a tougher standard that requires more long-term thought from workers and their attorneys ahead of bringing suit. For now, it means the law is more pro-worker in the greater Tampa area’s Second District and more management-friendly in the greater Palm Beach Fourth District.

A key part of discrimination litigation is “exhaustion” of administrate remedies—giving government employment regulators the opportunity to bring the case on behalf of the worker before the worker sues privately. The notice provided to those agencies is also given to the defendant employer, and requirements of the notice are frequently litigated, despite workers having to give notice prior to getting discovery in litigation.

The Fourth District ruled that explicit notice of potential Florida employment violations is required so employers can better prepare a defense. The Second District said the Steak ‘n Shake cook, who claimed his hours were cut due to racial and disability discrimination, didn’t have to mention specific state laws so long as he checked boxes on the legal topics involved in the Florida Civil Rights Act (FCRA).

The Second District acknowledged this conflicting ruling, and urged the state Supreme Court to consider the underlying question.

“If the legislature intended for the statutory language in section 760.11 to require that the aggrieved party specifically allege in the complaint that his or her claims were under the FCRA, it could have said so, but it did not,” Chief Judge Daniel H. Sleet wrote for the court. Holding otherwise would add “a requirement that is not found anywhere within the statute and contravenes the legislature’s clear intent that the statute be interpreted liberally.”

The case is Ramos v. Steak N Shake, Inc., Fla. Dist. Ct. App., 2d Dist., No. 2D22-3465, opinion 12/20/23.