Religious Accommodation Ruling Raises More Workplace Questions

In a rare unanimous decision on June 29, the US Supreme Court expanded an employer’s obligation to accommodate the religious needs of its employees under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Pitting business interests against religious rights, the case presented a unique dilemma for the most pro-business and pro-religion high court in recent memory.

The dispute in Groff v. DeJoy involved a Sabbatarian postal worker in rural Pennsylvania who quit his job and sued his employer after being subjected to “progressive discipline” for refusing to work his Sunday shifts.

The justices, in a decision written by Justice Samuel Alito, refused to fully accept the arguments of either party and took a compromise position that accommodation is required unless it would result in “substantial” costs in the “overall context of an employer’s business.” In addition to broadening an employer’s accommodation requirements, the court considered the additional question of when an accommodation that burdens a religious employees’ colleagues—but doesn’t burden the business itself—would be required.

Despite its enormous implications, the issue of harm to coworkers has remained largely under the radar. And the court provided surprisingly little guidance other than holding that the impact on coworkers must “have ramifications for the conduct of the employer’s business.”

Despite its minimal guidance, this decision could potentially curtail rights of coworkers. Prior to Groff, most federal appellate courts determined that accommodations impacting religious employees’ coworkers—such as those requiring them to work the religious employee’s undesirable weekend shifts or subjecting them to unwanted proselytization— would not be required, regardless of whether the business is directly harmed.

It’s now unclear under what circumstances employers will be permitted to shift the increased cost of accommodation to a religious employee’s coworkers.

Take, for example, the most common type of accommodation requests: time off from work for religious observance. In these cases, either coworkers can bear the cost of accommodation by covering for the religious employee, or the employer can bear the cost of accommodation by hiring additional workers, paying premium wages, or suffering a loss of productivity.

Unless an accommodation that impacts coworkers also harms the conduct of the business itself, such as through a loss of productivity or efficiency, the cost to coworkers will not be a justification for denying an accommodation.

Coworkers similarly could be harmed in cases involving accommodation of religious expression. The Supreme Court correctly emphasized that a coworker’s bias or animosity to a religious practice—such as an aversion to dealing with bearded people—would not constitute a defense under Title VII. Yet in broadly holding that an employee’s “dislike” of religious expression in the workplace is irrelevant, the court ignored the fact that coworkers may dislike the religious expression because it’s demeaning or offensive.

This issue is of particular concern where religious expression demeans LGBTQ+ people. In an earlier case, the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit determined that an employer didn’t need to accommodate a religious employee’s request to post the Bible verse “If a man also lie with mankind … both of them have committed an abomination; they shall surely be put to death.” After the court’s decision on June 29, it’s unclear whether this type of demeaning religious expression would be prohibited and constitute a substantial cost on the business.

In another case that pitted religious liberties against the rights of LGBTQ+ individuals, a federal appellate court recently ruled that Title VII doesn’t require a school district in Indiana to accommodate a teacher’s religious objection to addressing transgender students by their names. It’s unclear after Groff if the accommodation of this type of speech would result in a “substantial” cost or whether dignitary harms to students would impact the “conduct of the business” in a manner that Title VII prohibits.

It’s a scary thought that some lower courts may now require permitting expression that demeans LGBTQ+ individuals under a civil rights law aimed at prohibiting employment discrimination and providing equality in the workplace.

Like many compromises, it’s uncertain how this decision will play out in the lower courts and whether coworkers will end up bearing the brunt of the increased religious accommodation requirement—possibly being forced to work on weekends and subject to derogatory speech that wouldn’t be tolerated if it didn’t originate from religious beliefs. What’s clear is that this decision permits the Roberts Court to maintain its status as one of the most pro-business and pro-religion courts in modern times.

The case is: Groff v. DeJoy, U.S., No. 22-174, 6/29/23

This article does not necessarily reflect the opinion of Bloomberg Industry Group, Inc., the publisher of Bloomberg Law and Bloomberg Tax, or its owners.

Author Information

Debbie Kaminer is a professor of law at Baruch College at the City University of New York (CUNY) and writes on religion and the law, employment discrimination, and vaccine mandates.

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